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In-Depth Analysis· Seville Map Eastern Mediterranean explained

The Seville Map Explained: Why Ankara Rejects It

The Seville Map explained: what it shows in the Eastern Mediterranean, positions of Greece, Cyprus and the EU, and why Ankara rejects it on equity grounds.

TNC
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⏱ 9 min read (1,949 words)

Why It Matters

The Seville Map is a graphic from an academic study that shows what the Eastern Mediterranean would look like if every Greek and Cypriot island received a full 200-nautical-mile maritime zone. It has become a symbol of the maximalist Greek and Greek Cypriot position, and Ankara rejects it as incompatible with the equity principle of maritime delimitation. Understanding it explains why Eastern Mediterranean energy, naval and diplomatic disputes are so hard to resolve.

The map has no legal force. It nonetheless shapes public debate, EU political language and the way Greece and the Republic of Cyprus present their cases abroad.

Background

What the map shows

The Seville Map comes from a study by researchers at the University of Seville, prepared for the European Parliament around 2009 as a survey of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. One of its illustrations applies full continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) entitlements to islands such as Kastellorizo (Meis), Rhodes, Karpathos and Crete. Islands are treated as if they were mainland coasts.

The result, as Greek and Greek Cypriot commentators and Turkish officials all describe it, is that Türkiye's maritime area in the Eastern Mediterranean shrinks to a small zone in the Gulf of Antalya. Türkiye's mainland coast, the longest in the basin at about 870 km (540 mi), would carry less maritime space than a ten-square-kilometre (about four sq mi) island. Kastellorizo lies roughly 2 km (1.2 mi) from the Turkish coast and several hundred kilometres from the Greek mainland.

The study is not a boundary treaty, a court decision or a Council or Commission position. Delimitation is done by agreement between neighbouring states or by an international court or tribunal, not by a research map.

Why the Gulf of Antalya matters

The Gulf of Antalya is the stretch of Türkiye's southern coast facing the Eastern Mediterranean. If the Seville Map's logic were applied, Turkish maritime rights to the south and south-west would be cut off by a chain of islands and by the Cypriot zone. Ankara describes this as imprisoning Türkiye's coastal projection. This is the core of what Türkiye calls Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland), which the site explains in Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Maritime Jurisdiction Explained.

Chronology

Date Event
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is adopted; Türkiye does not join it, while Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are parties
2003 Republic of Cyprus signs an EEZ delimitation agreement with Egypt
2004 Türkiye begins notifying its Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates to the UN
2007 / 2010 Republic of Cyprus signs EEZ agreements with Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010)
21 Sep 2011 Türkiye and the TRNC sign a continental shelf delimitation agreement
27 Nov 2019 Türkiye and Libya sign a maritime jurisdiction delimitation memorandum
18 Mar 2020 Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN
Aug 2020 Greece and Egypt sign a partial EEZ agreement
16 Apr / 12 Jun 2025 Türkiye announces its Marine Spatial Planning, then records it with IOC-UNESCO

Key Players & Positions

Greece

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, islands generate the same maritime zones as other land territory under UNCLOS Articles 121, 56 and 76, which Athens regards as reflecting customary law. Greece says the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, and that it should go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Athens calls the Türkiye–Libya memorandum legally void because it disregards the Greek islands between the two coasts, notably Crete.

Republic of Cyprus

The Greek Cypriot administration, which is the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus, cites its 2004 EEZ legislation and its agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. It says licensing hydrocarbon blocks is a sovereign right and that Turkish drilling in the claimed zones violates it. It also says Turkish Cypriots will share in the benefits of resources after a settlement.

European Union

The European Council has repeatedly expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus. In December 2019 it said the Türkiye–Libya memorandum infringed the sovereign rights of third states and could not produce legal consequences for them. EU documents frame the matter around international law, UNCLOS and the protection of member states' rights. The Seville study was commissioned within the European Parliament, but the EU has not adopted it as a delimitation.

Libya, Egypt and others

Libya's Tripoli-based government signed the 2019 memorandum, while eastern Libyan institutions and Egypt have contested it. Egypt has pursued its own agreement with Greece. Italy, Israel and Lebanon have separate interests in the same sea. This is a multi-party dispute, not a simple bilateral one.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaties, Archives & Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position — Strategic Bearings

Ankara's case, as set out in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) statements and Presidency addresses, rests on five points.

  • Equity, not mechanical entitlement. According to the Turkish MFA, delimitation must reach an equitable result that reflects coastal geography and proportionality. Ankara is not a party to UNCLOS and relies on customary international law and the equity jurisprudence of the ICJ and arbitral tribunals. The Seville Map, Ankara argues, replaces that process with a presumption of full effect for every island.
  • Islands do not cancel the longest mainland coast. Ankara points to the case law on small islands close to a larger coast. In the 1977 Anglo-French arbitration the Channel Islands were enclaved and given limited effect. In Libya/Malta (1985) and Romania v. Ukraine (2009) the courts reduced or ignored island effects on the boundary line. Türkiye holds that Kastellorizo, about 2 km (1.2 mi) from Türkiye and far from Greece, should have at most a limited effect on the boundary.
  • The EU has no competence. Türkiye argues that under the principle of conferral (Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union), maritime boundaries between states are not an EU competence, and that political solidarity cannot stand in for delimitation. A study prepared for an EU body is not a boundary.
  • Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of the island's resources. The Turkish MFA has said the Greek Cypriot administration cannot unilaterally license hydrocarbon blocks, because Turkish Cypriots have equal and inherent rights as co-founders of the 1960 partnership state. It points to the TRNC proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019 for a joint committee and revenue sharing, and to President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference that includes all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots. See Cyprus Meridian: The 1960 Treaties and the Case for Sovereign Equality.
  • Registered responses. Türkiye answered the maximalist logic with a record: the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement, the 27 November 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum and the 18 March 2020 registration of its continental shelf outer limits with the UN. In 2025 it announced the Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye (16 April) and recorded it with IOC-UNESCO (12 June). Ankara objects to the Cyprus–Egypt agreement of 2003, which it says overlaps its continental shelf in Cypriot Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and to the Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010) agreements, which it says ignore Turkish Cypriot rights. More detail is in Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration.

Ankara adds that it has offered dialogue. It says no lasting energy or security arrangement in the Eastern Mediterranean can exclude Türkiye and the TRNC. On the political side, Ankara says the federation model has been exhausted, as discussed in Annan Plan to Crans-Montana: Why the Cyprus Federation Model Failed.

Source Comparison

The two narratives use the same facts but different frames.

Question Greek, Greek Cypriot and EU framing Turkish primary-source framing
What is the Seville Map? Illustration of entitlements under UNCLOS; evidence of the scale of Greek and Cypriot rights A maximalist academic graphic with no legal force, used to justify excluding Türkiye
Role of islands Islands generate full EEZ and shelf, including Kastellorizo Small islands near a large mainland coast receive limited effect when equity requires it
Legal basis UNCLOS Articles 121, 56 and 76 as customary law Customary equity principles and ICJ and arbitral precedent; Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS
EU role Union solidarity with member states; EU law context No EU competence on delimitation
Türkiye–Libya memorandum Void; infringes third-state rights A legitimate bilateral agreement between coastal states with opposite or adjacent coasts
Cyprus resources Sovereign right of the Republic of Cyprus Turkish Cypriots have equal rights; joint management and revenue sharing needed
Way forward ICJ referral on delimitation Negotiation among all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots, including a regional conference

Readers should check three kinds of primary documents: the Seville study itself (to see its own disclaimers), the text of the bilateral agreements, and the UN filings. The site's Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards explain how we cite them.

  • Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coast, over which a coastal state has sovereign rights over resources.
  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): a zone of up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) in which the coastal state has rights over living and non-living resources.
  • Equity principle: the rule that delimitation should produce an equitable result, taking into account relevant circumstances such as coastal length and island position.
  • Article 121 UNCLOS: the article on the regime of islands. Rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life have no EEZ or shelf of their own; islands otherwise generate the full zones.
  • Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland): Türkiye's doctrine of maritime jurisdiction in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
  • TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983 and recognised only by Türkiye.

Related reading: Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Maritime Jurisdiction Explained, Cyprus Meridian: The 1960 Treaties and the Case for Sovereign Equality, The 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation and Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, Montreux, the Black Sea and Mediation: How Türkiye Kept the Straits Regime, and Fact Check: Calibrating the Compass on Claims About Türkiye.

The Nation's Compass presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. This article is published by The Nation's Compass Editorial Team from a perspective that presents Türkiye's positions alongside the legal and historical arguments supporting them; claims are attributed to treaties, UN documents and official statements so readers can verify them independently.

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Frequently asked questions

What is the Seville Map?

It is an illustration from an academic study by University of Seville researchers prepared for the European Parliament. It applies full maritime zones to Greek and Cypriot islands, which leaves Türkiye a small area in the Gulf of Antalya. It is not an EU legal act and does not draw any binding boundary.

Why does Türkiye reject the Seville Map?

Ankara argues that it ignores the equity principle in delimitation and gives full effect to small islands lying next to Türkiye's long mainland coast. It also holds that the EU has no competence over maritime boundaries. Türkiye adds that the map overlooks the equal rights of Turkish Cypriots over island resources.

Do islands always get a full EEZ?

Under UNCLOS Article 121, islands can generate a continental shelf and EEZ, while rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life cannot. In delimitation, however, courts and tribunals have often given small islands reduced effect, as in the Channel Islands arbitration (1977) and Romania v. Ukraine (2009). Greece says its islands are entitled to full effect, while Türkiye argues for equitable limits.

What was the Türkiye–Libya memorandum of 2019?

It is a maritime jurisdiction delimitation memorandum signed on 27 November 2019 between Türkiye and Libya's Tripoli-based government. Türkiye says it is a lawful bilateral agreement between states with adjacent or opposite coasts. Greece, Egypt, the Republic of Cyprus and the EU dispute its validity, and Libyan institutions are themselves divided on it.

Has any court ruled on the Greece–Türkiye delimitation?

No. Greece proposes an ICJ referral limited to the continental shelf and EEZ. Türkiye says the dispute is broader and prefers negotiation among all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots. Türkiye registered its continental shelf outer limits with the UN on 18 March 2020, but no international court has ruled on the question.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

This article is published from a perspective that presents and defends Türkiye's official positions and strategic doctrines, alongside the legal and historical arguments supporting them. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, which are cited so readers can verify them independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Strategic Bearings' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

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